On the Severity of the Economic Condition

I have recently found numerous useful videos and links concerning the current economic crisis. I believe that the economic danger that the entire world is in cannot be overstated. If you want to know what I believe this, then this is where I recommend you begin:

First, I recommend a very clear visual explanation of the current crisis involving sub-prime mortgages: Part 1, Part 2. It is called "The Crisis of Credit, Visualized". This is about the easiest way to understand what is happening in the economy right now if you only have 10 minutes. I would like to point out that according to the explanation in this video, it appears that the bailout package is nothing more than the American people paying the loans that banks took out so they could leverage them into mortgages. In other words, we are paying for the risks that they took to make a little more money. How absurd, considering we received none of the benefit of the leveraged mortgages!

The next piece I would recommend is an explanation of the mechanism of the Fed. A good place to start is an interview with political and economic guru, G. Edward Griffin, who explains why the Fed and its large brethren banks are a scam.

Considering that the banks' practice of creating money out of nothing (selling us debt) is the cause of inflation, watching this interview (only the first 8 1/2 minutes) ought to invoke a note of horror as one realizes that the ultimate economic effect of this inflation is to reduce the amount of money the middle class has and increase the amount of money the top tier has.

If the preceding links do not convince you that something is fundamentally wrong with how our economy is working, then I urge you to at least listen to Gerald Celente, whose social, political and economic trend-casting has been astoundingly accurate.

So who should we turn to? Who has a solution? If only the government were run by persons like George Soros. Then perhaps we would have a few critical minds who have a clear vision of how problems need to be solved rather than avoided. Though perhaps Soros' infamy would preclude him in particular from being considered a leader; nevertheless, his understanding of how people function in large groups is impressive. I have already mentioned Peter Joseph and the Venus Project who have a very optimistic vision of how the world could be. Perhaps we just need the appropriate goal. George Soros, of course, is not nearly as optimistic, at least for the near future.

Something big is about to happen. It's time to have Plan B prepared, folks.

-Priam's Pride

How Student Loans Have Helped Make America Stupid

Out of youthful indifference, I attended an undergraduate school that no-one has ever heard of. Looking back on this choice, I sometimes wonder where I would be if I had put some effort into thinking out how I wanted to live my life and how I was going to survive after college. But this is not to say that I regret the choice, for to do so would be to deny that the school ultimately came to mean something to me, which it did. Nevertheless, indifference in my youth caused two things: (1) an absurd amount of student loan debt, due to the fact that I attended a private school; and (2) a degree with which I could do virtually nothing. Again, do not think that I discourage loving a subject so much as to want to study it without regard for the monetary outcome. Indeed, I myself would rather be a starving artist than than a thriving businessman. So it is not that I reject love of the arts, as this would be contradiction considering my own love for them. Rather, I reject that there is such a dichotomy as starving artists versus thriving businessmen. And yet it seems as though, today, I must become a businessman of some sort in order to survive.

I am now in my last semester of a Master of Arts program in philosophy at LSU. "Why are you there?" you might ask me. To this I would respond that I am here because my appetite was whetted in my undergraduate career and this was a chance to learn more about a subject in which I had already promised myself a future Ph.D. I am here because in order to get a decent job doing philosophy, one must come out of a top school. But what if I do not get into a top school, because admission rates are cutthroat? Sounds like I'm in trouble, aren't I? And this is all prior to the process of attempting to find a job in academia. It seems as if I simply must have high standards for myself from now on, so that I can scrape by. "At least," I will tell myself, "I am doing what I want to be doing."

But is being a professor what I want to be doing? Suppose that in the course of my career at LSU, I discovered that I needed no more direction in philosophy except for access to an excellent library and an occasional conversation with an expert. Suppose, that is, that I have matured enough academically to be competent to begin work on a dissertation. Suppose also that I have no particular love for teaching in the traditional classroom setting. And while we're imagining possible worlds, let us consider that even if I do land a professorship, I will be bogged down by bureaucratic policies which are designed to save the school money rather than advance human knowledge. It seems as if professors are required to teach classes that they often do not want to teach (for not everyone wants to be training novices -- it takes a certain kind of love), in addition to their requirement to jump through administrative and bureaucratic hoops. So let us imagine that the road to getting a Ph.D. is long, difficult and redundant (considering how many classes I will still have to take); and let us imagine that obtaining a professorship is extremely difficult; and finally let us imagine that when I am a professor, I will still have very little time for research, writing, and teaching those who want to hear what I have to say. Now let us cease imagining, for this picture is reality.

But if this possible world is the real world, then it seems as if I will not be doing what I want to do if I end up being a professor. So why on Earth would I put myself through all the hard work, all the lip-synching, all the form-filling that is involved in acquiring a professorship? What is the real reason that I am still pursuing a Ph.D.? It is because I was fooled, hoodwinked, I've been had. When I was a kid I was convinced that it was a good idea to take on tens of thousands of dollars in debt in the hopes of being able to pay that back. But this is not a lucrative investment. I have been sold a raw deal before I even knew what a deal was. The fact of the matter is that my investment is virtually guaranteed not to be able to pay for itself. The reason for this is that while I am in school, my interest compounds (because my parents were not quite poor enough to secure subsidized loans for me) and increases the capital; but, statistically speaking, I will almost certainly never get a job in philosophy that will allow me to pay back these loans in any reasonable or comfortable fashion. The most likely way for me to pay back my student loans (if I ever do) is through hard work at a job that I will probably hate.

So why am I still in school, then? The reason is simple. While I am in school, I do not have to pay back the student loans. So as long as I stay in school, the absurd dream of landing a perfect professorial job is still alive, and I need not pay for anything.

You might suggest to me that I enter a different field. And if I were to meet my former self, I certainly would have tried to give him some sense before willingly accepting all those loans. But the problem is that I have been groomed for a professorship -- it seems to be my doom. I am trained in virtually nothing else (nothing practical, anyway).

My best solution is this: (1) I will stay in school as long as I can; (2) while I am here I will seek reform; and (3) if reform is not possible, I will assist in revolution.

What the America is doing to its young intelligensia is criminal. We are crippled by debt incurred before we even know the consequences. We are soon to become the educated but homeless. Our parents owed it to us to secure us a good education which can be attained without personal debt, but this has not been done. We are the future and we are being downtrodden; it is as if America wants its leaders to be unintelligent and uncultured profiteers. It's no wonder that popular culture reduces to little more than advertisement and immediate unhealthy physical pleasure. The first generates profit and the second appeals to the palate of the ignorant. For example, most people do not know what good art is because they have been provided no experience of it. And you know, reader, what I mean. When you speak to the average American about music or movies, you are always disappointed at the overt ignorance and poor taste that the average American has. From Brittany Spears to The Fast and the Furious, from CSI to John Grisham novels. You are disappointed and I am too.

America has become stupid and ignorant. And now they do not even have a profit to show for their ignorance. We now have the opportunity to learn the lesson that our ignorance and stupidity cannot be allowed to persist any longer. We cannot let ourselves be fooled by banks who sell you money for more money. We cannot let ourselves be fooled by political parties who are more interested in combating each other than devising a sustainable political atmosphere. We must come out of our ignorance!

But are we already too stupid and ignorant to learn this lesson?

-Priam's Pride

Why Are Peter Joseph and Alex Jones Opponents?

To anyone reading this who has not availed herself of the new political activist movie, Zeitgeist: Addendum, I highly recommend you watch it. This is one of the most profound works of film I have ever seen. Be warned, there are some inaccuracies in the film, but on the whole it seems to accurately characterize the spirit of the times. In fact, parts of this post assume some familiarity with the film, so if you won't watch it for yourself, at least watch it for me.

I just watched the debate between Alex Jones (of The Alex Jones Show) and Peter Joseph (creator of Zeitgeist and Zeitgeist: Addendum) on Alex Jones' show in a four-part You Tube series:

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4

I have to say that there is an important event happening right now, which this debate outlines. These two men each represent a social movement which is attempting to build up support. Alex Jones' movement has sped up lately and Peter Joseph entered the scene with a bang. What is interesting about these two movements is that they are almost parallel in their criticism of the status quo.

Both have been accused of being conspiracy theorists, and therefore they live on the social margin. Alex Jones believes that the Bilderberg Group is a self-conscious tyrannical entity. This group is populated by the very most powerful persons in the world, and Alex Jones' movement believes that this group uses the corporate machine (most notably the American economy, which in turn affects to all other economies) to control and herd the less fortunate masses. Details about this can be found in Alex Jones' documentary Endgame.

Peter Joseph, on the other hand, believes that the conspiracy is more organic and less self-conscious. Peter Joseph may or may not believe that they Bilderberg Group is responsible for all tyrannical governmental and corporate acts, but he does believe that there is a de facto social stratum which has enslaved the rest of the population. For Peter Joseph, the Bilderberg Group is considered to be the most powerful of the elite stratum which does the enslaving, but that does not make it the only autonomous such group. Peter Joseph seems more inclined to think that the Bilderberg Group is simply a powerful symptom of the tendency to tyranny which the practice of using currency ushers in. For Peter Joseph, in the end the corporate elite end up ruling the world because they have all the money. They probably do not sit at a large round table to discuss how they can further enslave the world and commit other such evil deeds.

What is interesting about these two is that they are both highly critical of the received story of 9/11. Both believe that it was a set-up which was agreed upon by those who rule -- the difference is how they believe it was conceived. For both men, the point of the attack was to push legislature through the system via scare tactics. They might even agree on who ordered the attack. What they disagree about is this: for Alex Jones, the attack was a plot to enslave the world; for Peter Smith, the attack was a plot to increase profit which ultimately ends up enslaving the world.

But what does this difference amount to? It amounts to a great deal. Alex Jones believes that the men in charge are highly intelligent, but evil. For Alex Jones, the Bilderberg Group knows nothing that we do not know -- it's just that they have no qualms with destroying us. For Peter Joseph, the Bilderberg Group, or what he calls the "corporatocracy" is not self-consciously evil. For Peter Joseph, the corporatocracy are merely corrupt. This conclusion is a natural result of the claim that the ethical code of the corporatocracy is the maximization of profits, regardless of te consequences.

This difference highlights an issue on which these two movements butt heads. There are a few such issues which I wish to address in this post. The reason I want to address these issues is that these two movements have been trying to undermine each other lately, which is obviously folly. There is so much in common between them that the fact that they cannot have a rational debate makes them both look foolish. For both sides actively support rational debate and critical thought. Consider, for example, this post which collects much criticism of religious claims in Zeitgeist. One can also check ConspiracyScience for many good critical points about claims throughout Zeitgeist, (and, by association, Loose Change). What is particularly absurd about these sorts of critics is that many of the people who actively try to debunk claims made in Zeitgeist are Alex Jones supporters. ConspiracyScience even goes so far as to claim that Peter Joseph is a member of the NWO (hence he is evil). On the other hand, those who subscribe to the Zeitgeist Movement typically criticize Alex Jones followers as adopting too religious of a tone.

So why do these two sides not try to find some way to cooperate? Well, this is not too hard to figure out, though it seems as if many of the constituents of these movements, in fact, have not found out. Alex Jones and his followers tend to be religious types. Why? Because the claim is that the NWO is an evil empire of Illuminati Satan-worshippers. The only way to construe today's Tyranny (the Bilderberg Group, for Alex Jones) as both intelligent and Satan-worshipping is if one can construe them also as evil. In other words, only if one accepts that Satan exists in the first place can one actually bring oneself to believe that the most powerful people on Earth are Satan-worshippers. To an atheist or an agnostic, it is just foolhardy to believe such a thing. The most powerful people on Earth are probably also some of the most intelligent, so if one does not accept the existence of Satan, then it seems rather implausible that such an unpopular religion would dominate the elite. What is even more absurd about the claims that Alex Jones' followers make is that it seems as if anyone who is against Alex Jones is part of the NWO. Sounds like a cult to me -- or at least a self-fulfilling prophecy. And I won't even begin with the Biblical prophecies derived from the Book of Revelation or the prophecies attributed to Nostradamus. Frankly, the strangely hypocritical closed-mindedness of the followers of Alex Jones (and Alex Jones himself) will likely be the downfall of this movement. In any case, it seems as if Alex Jones has lost himself in his own bizarre dogmas, so at the end of the day we might have to dismiss him as an eccentric.

Peter Joseph, however, is also not free of blame. If anyone claims to be a friend of truth, it is Peter Joseph. Yet the first part of Zeitgeist is now famous for asserting a multitude of inaccuracies about the history of religion. In the movie, Joseph claims that the Christian religion essentially plagiarized most of its central features from other previously existing religions. The support he gives for this, though, is mostly found in non-scholarly New Age works with an anti-Christian lean, such as the infamous Acharya S. (whose views are nevertheless admirable). In any case, a rather poor scholarly showing in Zeitgeist has undermined Joseph's claim to be a harbinger of truth. Of course, we must ask the question whether Peter Joseph knowingly included misinformation. If he was simply a poor researcher, then he may be forgiven (for he is an artist by trade). However, if he is consciously distorting the facts, then his motives may be questioned.

So how do we decide which of these is true of Peter Joseph? Well the answer is not so clear. All one needs to do is watch an interview of Peter Joseph to see that he truly believes what he is saying. Based on the way he speaks, it is really quite difficult to believe that he is trying to distort the truth. He really believes that there are problems with the status quo, the popular religions, and dogmatic claims in general. Is he willing to sacrifice his integrity as an advocate of truth in order to attack what he conceives as the demons of the world? That's a question that Peter Joseph himself must answer (publicly, in my view). Nevertheless, his worldview is a generally healthy one, provided that a few aspects are modified. First, he must distinguish between religion and spirituality. Joseph is frequently accused of advocating a world religion, but what he really wants is a recognition that spirituality can be achieved without the need for religion at all. His opponents do not see the distinction, so they accuse him of being a religious figure. It is, therefore, a burden that Peter Joseph must bear to explain this distinction. Second, he must relinquish his ties to conspiracy theories like the 9/11 conspiracy theory he advocates in Zeitgeist. His message is powerful enough that he does not need a controversial conspiracy theory. His theory about the de facto conspiracy, a conspiracy which is not conscious of itself, is a much more plausible theory.

Given these modifications, I can accept Peter Joseph's (and the Venus Project's) vision as the most profoundly beneficial and progressive vision advanced thus far. Unfortunately, I don't think that the world is ready to accept such a vision. As much as I would love to begin building a world where there is no money and where machines can take care of the menial tasks that people are employed to do, I don't think it is yet possible to convince people to let go of money. We've buried ourselves too deeply in money to simply jump out of the grave; we must climb. Therefore, we ought simply to focus on wrestling control of the world from corporate hands. Perhaps when this happens, a Rawlsian vision of the world may be realized. And we will see what happens from there.

-Priam's Pride

The World As a Riddle

If the world is inherently knowable by the human mind -- or even if it is a knowable construction of the human mind -- then it would not be inappropriate to categorize it as a riddle. For in any riddle the answer lies hidden in the question. This is why philosophers always talk about asking the "right" questions.

-Priam's Pride

Do Genuine Miracles Necessitate a Supernatural Explanation? Or: What Did Wittgenstein Really Mean?

I apologize for having been silent so long. I've been working on papers and trying to enjoy the bits of winter break that I have allowed myself.

My wife, our friend Jessica, and I were watching Jessica's Indigo Girls DVD (they are a bluesy girl duo) today. During one of the songs, there was an image of some statue of Mary which was bleeding. Having been raised Catholic, I was not surprised by the image, nor do I doubt that it is genuine. I know of enough reports about miracles, from ghosts to group visions to bleeding statues, that I do not doubt that such things have, indeed, happened. In many cases, large crowds witnessed some particular event and all reported agreeing experiences. These crowds are sometimes public and, therefore, consisting of constituents of many different sections of society. To simply dismiss such varied sources of consistent data seems crazy; just as singular people who believe they have had such experiences seem crazy.

So, let us say that this bleeding statue is genuine. That is, suppose that I have a miraculous experience. What should it mean to a godless person like myself? The standard religious argument against the naturalist is: how do you explain miracles? The standard naturalist response is to prove that there are no miracles. David Hume did most of the work in his naturalist reduction of miracles to events which simply admit no current physical explanation, but might in the future. Today the explanation is merely an updated and sometimes modified Humean reduction.

Should it seem more likely that miracles exist than that miracles do not exist, then the Humean reduction will not work. So, for instance, if a statue is found to be bleeding real human blood and if upon examination the statue is found to be normal in every way, then one should conclude that no scientific explanation can be had. The anomaly is simply too bizarre. Now I have never had such an experience and I do not expect to have such an experience in my lifetime, so there is no personal urgency for me to find an explanation for such an experience. But should I have such an experience, how might I explain it?

First, I will posit that it is a basic feature of human existence that I must find an explanation for any experience that I have. This means that I must somehow produce for myself a reason or description of the causal mechanisms which bring the events which I witness into existence. Or, to put it yet another way, that I ask both "How?" and "Why?" about every aspect of my experience is part of what makes me human. I take this principle as basic without argument, but an argument can be had -- just not here.

Second, I posit the existence of the physical world because common sense dictates that I must.

Third, we also assume that this physical world must be a world that is capable of being explained; that the question "How?" is generally answerable. And science is the answer. These will be my three premises.

Now we see that the religious apologist has required us to explain miracles based on his acceptance of the first premise. So if I respond to the religious apologist's demand, then I also accept the first premise.

So how can we explain the statue? Well, the statue is part of the physical world, as is the blood. Therefore, I should look first at the physical world in which my experience occurs. Because the last two premises are the ones which support most of our physical explanations, this would be the most likely source of explanation in this particular case. Like Hume, I would try to find some scientific explanation that could make blood materialize on the surface of a statue. This, of course, is as ridiculous as turning straw into gold. The physical world simply does not have the ability to construct human blood out of air. The physical world can only construct human blood inside of a human body, which can only come either from other human bodies or from a long process of evolution. It is very difficult for the physical world to create human blood, so the hypothesis that it simply materialized naturally on the surface of the statue is just absurd.

So, if Hume fails us, must we conform to the demands of the religious?

Not so fast. Are we ready to begin positing new beings? That is, should Occam's razor have any sway over us? Well, because naturalists have rejected religion in the first place, one must assume that such naturalists have a reason to do so. This reason is, of course, their acceptance of Occam's razor. Thus, if we respond to the religious apologist's challenge, then we have already assumed Occam's razor, just as we have assumed the first premise. Occam's razor, then, will be our fourth premise.

So before we begin to create new beings (such as gods), let us examine our first and fourth premises. For it was our second and third premises which failed as an explanation earlier.

Our fourth premise, Occam's razor dictates that we are allowed to posit only those entities which are necessary to the explanation of the phenomena. It is a metaprinciple insofar as it regulates the sorts of principles which are admissible. Thus, this principle cannot explain the materialization of blood on the surface of a statue.

So that only leaves the first. Recall that we assumed as a basic feature of human nature that we are compelled to explain the phenomena we experience. But, if we are naturalists, should this first premise not be subsumed under the second and third premises? If humans are purely physical beings, then the compulsion to explain experience can, itself, be explained by scientifically explaining the human brain. But whether this premise is entirely captured by the second and third premises depends on what we mean by "explain". That is, if the act of explanation can also be reduced to an explanation of physical phenomena, only then will we be able to subsume the first premise under the second and third. But this is not so easy. Is it possible for an explanation of the phenomena explain itself? It is explanatory self-reference which we must now address.

So then what is an explanation? An explanation arises when a person observes a similarity within the occurrences of phenomena and seeks to provide a theoretical background for that similarity. An explanation is a rule which we have interpreted from the experiences that we have had. Indeed, it is almost the same concept as Wittgenstein's concept of a "rule". Where Wittgensteinian rules are only grammatical rules, rules governing meaning; the concept of a scientific explanation is a set of rules which govern physical interaction. But, as Wittgenstein suggests, we are limited in the degree to which we can intuit rules. The rule that I follow cannot be demonstrated to be the same rule that you follow, because the only input that I have from you is your behavior. But your behavior can be demonstrated to accord with many different rules (e. g. Kripke's "addition" and "quaddition" example). So human behavior, as a finite set of data, is insufficient to determine the infinite extension of the single rule that it is purported to follow.

Just as scientific theory is underdetermined by the sensory evidence, so behavioral rules are underdetermined by the sensory evidence. So a scientific explanation of how we explain things is underdetermined by the evidence. But the scientific explanation itself is underdetermined by the evidence. Scientific explanations are formulated in languages, which follow grammatical rules. So if the grammatical rules are underdetermined by the evidence (we could all exhibit the same behavior and still secretly be following different rules), then the the language of science is underdetermined by the evidence. And because the explanation of our concept of explanation occurs in the language of science (for it is really an explanation of the brain), the scientific explanation of our act of explanation is doubly underdetermined by the evidence: once when we formulate the language to do science and again when we actually do science. At this point, we will realize that science is supposed to explain the language, which explains the science, which explains the language, and so on ad infinitum. Not only do we have a regress on our hands, but we now have an infinitesimal explanatory capability -- we have underdetermined our explanation into oblivion. Before moving on, I should observe that I believe the preceding is the argument that Quine meant to expound in his "argument from above".

Clearly this is a problem to be avoided. It should be evident by now that explanations of behavior and explanations of physical phenomena are both constructed through the act of inductive reasoning. For in this type of reasoning, we observe a finite set of data and infer from it a rule of infinite extension. That is, we create classes for those events and objects which we observe to be the same in some way. So then what is it for two things to be the same? That is, what counts as criteria for an act of inductive reasoning? We cannot describe a class of beings unless we can know whether the beings fit into the class in the first place. But sameness of anything (sameness of red things is what Wittgenstein considers) still relies on behavioral evidence. I can only know what sorts of things people believe to be red by their behavior -- the things that they point to and call "red". So if I describe red things as being the same in their redness and describe the word "same" behaviorally, then I am stuck in the very same unacceptable regress as with the "explanation" and "rule".

The problem is that we have too many variables and not enough equations. We will never find the solution to a set of three equations which have four variables. Not enough input is given to us to explain the input given. In trying to solve these three equations, we will find ourselves producing solutions of any three variables in terms of the fourth one. This is just what we have tried to do above. We can produce explanations of various different concepts in terms of other concepts that are different from them, but we cannot definitively explain any of these concepts. In trying to do so, we only prove that we have explained away our ability to explain in the first place. Or, as I have said before: all terms are defined in terms which, themselves, require defining.

For Wittgenstein, the problem is that we have not taken enough as basic. Indeed, when you exhibit the behavior that accords with the addition rule which I follow, I find that I believe that you are also following this same addition rule. So if, in any behavior of yours which follows a rule, I take you to be following the same rule that I follow, then I assume that in at least these ways, you are the same as me. For, as Wittgenstein says, this is our life-form. What we must ultimately take as basic, then, is the act of inductive reasoning. We must take it as basic that we are all inclined to infer rules with infinite extension from a finite set of data.

Thus, when I interpret what you mean when you speak, or when I interpret what your body-language suggests, I can be much more certain about whether we mean the same thing, because human beings naturally think in the same way. Of course, this means that there is no guarantee that we could speak with aliens, should we meet them. Or, as Wittgenstein puts it, we would not be able to converse with a lion if the lion could speak -- for they are a different life-form. Because scientific explanations cannot by themselves explain the certainty with which we believe we understand each other, we have chosen to take this certainty as basic. The result is that we no longer have the problem of explaining behavior, as we are inclined to behave in the same way (minimally speaking). We are inclined to devise languages between each other just as we are inclined to mate, to eat, to sleep, etc. But, of course, the animal instincts can be explained through science. Our problem is exclusive to human discourse, because science itself is a human discourse.

But, you might object, if we classify our inclination to reason inductively as a disposition, then it seems as if it would be subject to scientific explanation. That might be true. But we have not yet explained the mechanism by which we are disposed to reason inductively. In other words, not nearly enough is known about the brain to secure an explanation of inductive reasoning. Therefore, our taking this disposition to inductive reasoning as basic cannot, itself, be explained scientifically. Furthermore, if we do not yet have an explanation of the act of inductive reasoning, then we do not yet have good reason to assert that human beings share a life-form. To claim that inductive reasoning can support itself is to put the cart in front of the horse. Thus, the certainty with which we believe we understand each other (as evidenced by the volume of the literature we have written to each other) cannot be supported by the empirical evidence.

Based on the above considerations (thanks to Wittgenstein), I think we have good reason to take our ability to reason inductively as a basic premise of philosophical discourse -- and of discourse simpliciter. In fact, we have good reason to believe that we already do take our ability to reason inductively as basic. But what does this amount to? If inductive reasoning is taken as basic, then we can recognize what is the same; we can categorize these things; we can produce explanations of the differences between categories. In short, we can devise theories about the phenomena that we experience. But the very rules which we follow (addition rather than quaddition) are learned through inductive reasoning. We learn what is red by being shown red things. So our language begins with inductive reasoning and the language-game which we have mastered is nothing more than a theory of meaning.

But is the theory of meaning public or private? Well, we don't always mean the same things. You and I can have a conversation for 10 minutes thinking we are talking about the same thing and never discover that we were actually talking about different things all along. In other words, I can tell you the rule, but unless you actually do understand the language that I use in the same way that I understand it, you will not understand the rule. So if language can admit of multiple adequate understandings -- that is, if two persons can rationally interpret a single sentence in two different ways -- then those two persons mean the sentences in ways which are private. Of course, this doesn't mean that the content of the sentence is private. The whole point of the assumption that we have the same life-form is to secure the public nature of meaning. But the complex set of interlocking rules about appropriate word-usage and the concept of sameness -- i. e. our theory of meaning -- is one that is secured based on the assumption that meaning can be public. Therefore, the certainty that meaning is public is, itself, private. In this way, my theory of meaning may not be known to anyone else, but it is not necessarily private. Nothing that can be said is, itself, private. The only thing about meaning that is private is the certainty that you and I have the ability to understand each other.

But in allowing ourselves to assume the ability to reason inductively -- allowing ourselves to give in to the certainty that meaning is public -- means that we have granted ourselves an ability that we have not granted the rest of the world. The mind is privileged over the material world insofar as it has the ability to explain. But in granting the mind a unique ability, we also grant it basicality. If the human mind were not basic, then the ability would really be an ability that the world has. But the world can only produce human beings who scribble things down and make noises at each other. The physical world, by itself, does not produce meaning. We do.

In other words, we have separated the mind from the matter. Reader beware: I am not trying to verify some sort of complicated soul. Indeed I do not think of the mind as a thing independent of the brain; rather, it seems like an emergent event that only occurs in a healthy human being. Yet, as a naturalist, I must keep in mind that if I want to maintain naturalism, then I must only support the thesis that the mind occurred naturally. There is no reason that a naturalist must also be a monist. Of course this sort of dualism entails that the physical world precedes the mental world both chronologically and logically, for there could not be a mental world without the physical world. But, you might ask, what is the mental world? Well, the mental world is the totality of human communication. It is that which is spoken, written, built, invented, and even that which is imagined. Of course not all of the mental world can be preserved over time. Spoken words, organized events and the like only have meaning for those who remember them. That which is imagined only has meaning for the person who imagines it (though an imagining is, in principle, available to the public both pictorially and linguistically). And as soon as the last person dies, there will be no more meaning because meaning depends on the existence of the minds who think it.

But if the mind is basic in the same way that matter is basic, then we would expect that its complexity rivals that of matter, and that both would require extensive explanation. We might even expect that our explanations are as complicated and intricate as our explanations of matter. Indeed they are: just look at economics, political science and psychology. The very name "social sciences" should suggest to us that mind is distinct from matter, for what else could separate "social science" from "physical science"? One might even include philosophy itself among the social sciences.

Therefore, if the mind is basic in the same way that matter is, then we would expect that there are anomalies in our explanations of the interaction of minds. We would also expect that there is a great deal that we do not know (just as there is a great deal we do not know about the human brain).

Thus, as a naturalist seeking an explanation for the bleeding statue, the second place I would look is to the human mind. Indeed a mechanism is lacking here, and insofar as the mechanism is lacking, the explanation is far from adequate. Nevertheless, it is still absurd to think that human blood could form naturally on the side of a statue. We know enough about the physical world to know that this is impossible. But we know much more about the physical world than we know about our own minds. Therefore, it might be safe for the naturalist to bracket the experience off as being a possible result of the collective effort of human minds.

If the human mind is mostly a mystery to itself, then it should not surprise us if our minds present us with mysterious experiences from time to time.

Keep in mind, though, that we have defined the human mind as a thing which is primarily concerned with meaning, intentions behind actions, reasoning, etc. Thus, if our minds can produce a mysterious physical phenomenon, then the phenomenon must have a meaning. For why else would there be a collective mental effort if that collective effort was not our own minds telling us something?

So then what could the bleeding statue mean? Well, this all depends upon whether the statue is caused to bleed by a single mind or by many minds. And if it is caused to bleed by many minds, then is this collective mental effort, itself, intelligent? To put the matter in a cartoonish way: do all our minds conjoin to form a super-mind? These are all answers that cannot be given based on the premises that I have posited. In any case, I believe that I have provided a sketch of how the naturalist might proceed if presented with an apparently miraculous experience.

Then again, perhaps the bleeding statue is merely a hoax.

-Priam's Pride

Oh World!

This is a very rare occasion. I have felt compelled to write a poem, which has not happened in years. This poem is very unrefined. It does not have the sort of rhythm that it ought, and it does not rhyme at all. It's probably not a very good poem, but it captures something that I could not describe otherwise. If you think, reader, that I am writing about you, then you are right. So excuse my sometime pessimism, for not everyone can be upbeat everyday.



Oh world! You stony secretary standing
between my appointment and me,
You petulant frown upon my impatience.
Please, Miss, may I enter yet?
Oh world, I can wait only so long.
My confidence, once strong and chiseled
May soon be discarded by its sculptor.

Oh world, you beast! You vicious animal!
I only ever had love for you,
I only ever wanted the best.
Have you set your hellish minions upon me?
Do your spies feign to reciprocate?
You siren! Do not sing to my weakness,
For my weakness is my love.

And through the talk of politicians
And football, and school, and work,
Through the talk of money and need,
I always found you just beyond the word.
There you always stood, knowing my desire
To speak of you, to proclaim you to yourself.
I'd have been happy to speak only of you.

But your smirk, oh world, I cannot bear.
You mocked me with the voices of friends.
You despised me with the glance of my spouse.
You listened to my ardor in speaking of you,
Waiting until I'd said what I would,
Waiting until I'd said my greatest words
Only to reproach me for my senselessness.

So world, I apologize for ever caring
And stare at the ceiling wishing you'd let me be.
Wishing you'd hide yourself from me again,
For your beauty is unbearable as it is cruel,
Your cruelty lovable as it is absurd,
Your absurdity daunting as I am rational.
But I'll let you convince me of my insanity.

So I lay, filled to the brim,
Wondering, oh world, how it will end.
And I foolishly wish for ignorance of you
Until Somnus whispers in my ear
"There's still tomorrow, still tomorrow,
There's tomorrow, there's still tomorrow,
Tomorrow, there's always tomorrow..."

-Priam's Pride

On the Existence of Abstract Propositions and a Corresponding "Abstractese"

In the question of the ontological status of propositions, the realist claims that propositions are actually existing abstract entities to which our that-clauses refer. But if this is the case, then they must be in some sort of language -- for if they are not expressed linguistically in abstract-land, then it is hard to imagine how that-clauses could refer to them. That-clauses refer to concepts which seem to be expressed entirely through language. Indeed, what is an expression if not some sentence in some language? So which languageis it? Is it English? Surely not, because then English would be the perfect language: the language of thought. No, surely it is not any language that we now speak because if such a pure and natural language existed it surely would have revealed itself by now.

I am aware that a scientist might, here, complain that the language of nature is mathematics. But, I would respond, mathematics cannot explain itself in its own terms, and this has been proven by Gödel. The basic gist of Gödel's theorem is that no mathematical system can proven from a finite set of axioms, which means that no set of axioms can develop a system in which those axioms themselves are all provable. There is always a further axiom that must be added. And if a mathematical system is not provably true, then, in the multitude of mathematical systems, no one system can be a more appropriate language for absractese than any other.

But, you might say, what about a logical system? For because mathematical systems can be derived from symbolic logic, the natural language must be logic, which is more fundamental than mathematics. But the problem here is that logical language cannot support itself, as Quine, Putnam and Kripke's Wittgenstein have all independently shown. Language cannot explain itself in its own terms -- it cannot account for the experience of meaning that we all seem to have. Nothing like Frege's concept of a "sense" of a word, which is a meaning that is independent from the group of things to which we apply the word, has yet been found within language itself.

Therefore, abstractese must be some language that none of us speak. Let us call this language abstractese. So who speaks the perfect language out of which all propositions are formulated? Who has complete access to proposition-land where abstractese is the language of omniscience? Everyone should know the answer by now: It is God. The semantic realist has found a way to sneak God in through the backdoor. "God must exist," such a realist might claim, "because without him, there is nothing we could mean when we speak!"

It seems appropriate that we call mathematical realism "Platonism." For it was Plato that suggested to us that it wasn't enough for us to believe in an ontology of two substances: mind and matter (though Heraclitus did believe this, to his credit). Rather, he wanted us to believe in a third: the Good, where Forms and Mathematicals and other strange abstracta float freely. This one mistake has sent philosophy reeling for millennia. Plato was the first systematic philosopher who had a system worth mentioning, but it was a system that assumed an unprovable monism. Plato ignored the mind altogether and contrasted the physical world to the abstract. Out of respect for the more mysterious force, Plato decided that the abstract was the primary realm, and the physical was the derived realm. Of course, Christianity found a way to borrow this concept as well, which has provided years upon years of highly nuanced philosophy, otherwise known as "theology". Indeed, it was not until Descartes that we finally remembered that the mind creates its own realm. What Descartes should have mentioned was what Kant ultimately did mention: it is the mental and the physical which represent the real dichotomy. Those who ask what is outside the mind or outside the world are trying to posit things without sufficient cause.

The problem of the reference of words, phrases and entire clauses is the standard point of attack for realists against anti-realists. In this instance, the realist proposes these putatuve abstractese propositions as the objects to which that-clauses refer. But my question is this: if there is only the world and the mind that thinks the world, then why should our thoughts refer to anything but themselves? A thought can only be had mentally, so if the reference of the thought itself is mental, then the thought simply refers to itself. So if we adopt a mental ontology stance for propositions, that-clauses just refer to thoughts. How utterly intuitive!

But is this proof that some object or event named "mind" is the source of meaning? Well, the only proof that mind exists is the experience that a particular mind has. But because the specific content of this experience can only be explained after the fact, its existence is not provable deductively. Thus, the only evidence we have for the existence of the mind is inductive. But this essentially means that the act of inductive reasoning can only be supported inductively.

And here we have our answer. Symbolic logic and mathematics lacked the capability to prove their own premises. That is, deductive reasoning cannot be proven uniquely. But inductive reasoning can. If it is assumed that inductive reasoning leads us closer to the truth, then inductive reasoning can prove that it leads us closer to the truth, without the assistance of any other premise. So we have good reason to believe that abstractese is really the same as mentalese.

-Priam's Pride