Thursday, January 8, 2009

The World As a Riddle

If the world is inherently knowable by the human mind -- or even if it is a knowable construction of the human mind -- then it would not be inappropriate to categorize it as a riddle. For in any riddle the answer lies hidden in the question. This is why philosophers always talk about asking the "right" questions.

-Priam's Pride

Sunday, January 4, 2009

Do Genuine Miracles Necessitate a Supernatural Explanation? Or: What Did Wittgenstein Really Mean?

I apologize for having been silent so long. I've been working on papers and trying to enjoy the bits of winter break that I have allowed myself.

My wife, our friend Jessica, and I were watching Jessica's Indigo Girls DVD (they are a bluesy girl duo) today. During one of the songs, there was an image of some statue of Mary which was bleeding. Having been raised Catholic, I was not surprised by the image, nor do I doubt that it is genuine. I know of enough reports about miracles, from ghosts to group visions to bleeding statues, that I do not doubt that such things have, indeed, happened. In many cases, large crowds witnessed some particular event and all reported agreeing experiences. These crowds are sometimes public and, therefore, consisting of constituents of many different sections of society. To simply dismiss such varied sources of consistent data seems crazy; just as singular people who believe they have had such experiences seem crazy.

So, let us say that this bleeding statue is genuine. That is, suppose that I have a miraculous experience. What should it mean to a godless person like myself? The standard religious argument against the naturalist is: how do you explain miracles? The standard naturalist response is to prove that there are no miracles. David Hume did most of the work in his naturalist reduction of miracles to events which simply admit no current physical explanation, but might in the future. Today the explanation is merely an updated and sometimes modified Humean reduction.

Should it seem more likely that miracles exist than that miracles do not exist, then the Humean reduction will not work. So, for instance, if a statue is found to be bleeding real human blood and if upon examination the statue is found to be normal in every way, then one should conclude that no scientific explanation can be had. The anomaly is simply too bizarre. Now I have never had such an experience and I do not expect to have such an experience in my lifetime, so there is no personal urgency for me to find an explanation for such an experience. But should I have such an experience, how might I explain it?

First, I will posit that it is a basic feature of human existence that I must find an explanation for any experience that I have. This means that I must somehow produce for myself a reason or description of the causal mechanisms which bring the events which I witness into existence. Or, to put it yet another way, that I ask both "How?" and "Why?" about every aspect of my experience is part of what makes me human. I take this principle as basic without argument, but an argument can be had -- just not here.

Second, I posit the existence of the physical world because common sense dictates that I must.

Third, we also assume that this physical world must be a world that is capable of being explained; that the question "How?" is generally answerable. And science is the answer. These will be my three premises.

Now we see that the religious apologist has required us to explain miracles based on his acceptance of the first premise. So if I respond to the religious apologist's demand, then I also accept the first premise.

So how can we explain the statue? Well, the statue is part of the physical world, as is the blood. Therefore, I should look first at the physical world in which my experience occurs. Because the last two premises are the ones which support most of our physical explanations, this would be the most likely source of explanation in this particular case. Like Hume, I would try to find some scientific explanation that could make blood materialize on the surface of a statue. This, of course, is as ridiculous as turning straw into gold. The physical world simply does not have the ability to construct human blood out of air. The physical world can only construct human blood inside of a human body, which can only come either from other human bodies or from a long process of evolution. It is very difficult for the physical world to create human blood, so the hypothesis that it simply materialized naturally on the surface of the statue is just absurd.

So, if Hume fails us, must we conform to the demands of the religious?

Not so fast. Are we ready to begin positing new beings? That is, should Occam's razor have any sway over us? Well, because naturalists have rejected religion in the first place, one must assume that such naturalists have a reason to do so. This reason is, of course, their acceptance of Occam's razor. Thus, if we respond to the religious apologist's challenge, then we have already assumed Occam's razor, just as we have assumed the first premise. Occam's razor, then, will be our fourth premise.

So before we begin to create new beings (such as gods), let us examine our first and fourth premises. For it was our second and third premises which failed as an explanation earlier.

Our fourth premise, Occam's razor dictates that we are allowed to posit only those entities which are necessary to the explanation of the phenomena. It is a metaprinciple insofar as it regulates the sorts of principles which are admissible. Thus, this principle cannot explain the materialization of blood on the surface of a statue.

So that only leaves the first. Recall that we assumed as a basic feature of human nature that we are compelled to explain the phenomena we experience. But, if we are naturalists, should this first premise not be subsumed under the second and third premises? If humans are purely physical beings, then the compulsion to explain experience can, itself, be explained by scientifically explaining the human brain. But whether this premise is entirely captured by the second and third premises depends on what we mean by "explain". That is, if the act of explanation can also be reduced to an explanation of physical phenomena, only then will we be able to subsume the first premise under the second and third. But this is not so easy. Is it possible for an explanation of the phenomena explain itself? It is explanatory self-reference which we must now address.

So then what is an explanation? An explanation arises when a person observes a similarity within the occurrences of phenomena and seeks to provide a theoretical background for that similarity. An explanation is a rule which we have interpreted from the experiences that we have had. Indeed, it is almost the same concept as Wittgenstein's concept of a "rule". Where Wittgensteinian rules are only grammatical rules, rules governing meaning; the concept of a scientific explanation is a set of rules which govern physical interaction. But, as Wittgenstein suggests, we are limited in the degree to which we can intuit rules. The rule that I follow cannot be demonstrated to be the same rule that you follow, because the only input that I have from you is your behavior. But your behavior can be demonstrated to accord with many different rules (e. g. Kripke's "addition" and "quaddition" example). So human behavior, as a finite set of data, is insufficient to determine the infinite extension of the single rule that it is purported to follow.

Just as scientific theory is underdetermined by the sensory evidence, so behavioral rules are underdetermined by the sensory evidence. So a scientific explanation of how we explain things is underdetermined by the evidence. But the scientific explanation itself is underdetermined by the evidence. Scientific explanations are formulated in languages, which follow grammatical rules. So if the grammatical rules are underdetermined by the evidence (we could all exhibit the same behavior and still secretly be following different rules), then the the language of science is underdetermined by the evidence. And because the explanation of our concept of explanation occurs in the language of science (for it is really an explanation of the brain), the scientific explanation of our act of explanation is doubly underdetermined by the evidence: once when we formulate the language to do science and again when we actually do science. At this point, we will realize that science is supposed to explain the language, which explains the science, which explains the language, and so on ad infinitum. Not only do we have a regress on our hands, but we now have an infinitesimal explanatory capability -- we have underdetermined our explanation into oblivion. Before moving on, I should observe that I believe the preceding is the argument that Quine meant to expound in his "argument from above".

Clearly this is a problem to be avoided. It should be evident by now that explanations of behavior and explanations of physical phenomena are both constructed through the act of inductive reasoning. For in this type of reasoning, we observe a finite set of data and infer from it a rule of infinite extension. That is, we create classes for those events and objects which we observe to be the same in some way. So then what is it for two things to be the same? That is, what counts as criteria for an act of inductive reasoning? We cannot describe a class of beings unless we can know whether the beings fit into the class in the first place. But sameness of anything (sameness of red things is what Wittgenstein considers) still relies on behavioral evidence. I can only know what sorts of things people believe to be red by their behavior -- the things that they point to and call "red". So if I describe red things as being the same in their redness and describe the word "same" behaviorally, then I am stuck in the very same unacceptable regress as with the "explanation" and "rule".

The problem is that we have too many variables and not enough equations. We will never find the solution to a set of three equations which have four variables. Not enough input is given to us to explain the input given. In trying to solve these three equations, we will find ourselves producing solutions of any three variables in terms of the fourth one. This is just what we have tried to do above. We can produce explanations of various different concepts in terms of other concepts that are different from them, but we cannot definitively explain any of these concepts. In trying to do so, we only prove that we have explained away our ability to explain in the first place. Or, as I have said before: all terms are defined in terms which, themselves, require defining.

For Wittgenstein, the problem is that we have not taken enough as basic. Indeed, when you exhibit the behavior that accords with the addition rule which I follow, I find that I believe that you are also following this same addition rule. So if, in any behavior of yours which follows a rule, I take you to be following the same rule that I follow, then I assume that in at least these ways, you are the same as me. For, as Wittgenstein says, this is our life-form. What we must ultimately take as basic, then, is the act of inductive reasoning. We must take it as basic that we are all inclined to infer rules with infinite extension from a finite set of data.

Thus, when I interpret what you mean when you speak, or when I interpret what your body-language suggests, I can be much more certain about whether we mean the same thing, because human beings naturally think in the same way. Of course, this means that there is no guarantee that we could speak with aliens, should we meet them. Or, as Wittgenstein puts it, we would not be able to converse with a lion if the lion could speak -- for they are a different life-form. Because scientific explanations cannot by themselves explain the certainty with which we believe we understand each other, we have chosen to take this certainty as basic. The result is that we no longer have the problem of explaining behavior, as we are inclined to behave in the same way (minimally speaking). We are inclined to devise languages between each other just as we are inclined to mate, to eat, to sleep, etc. But, of course, the animal instincts can be explained through science. Our problem is exclusive to human discourse, because science itself is a human discourse.

But, you might object, if we classify our inclination to reason inductively as a disposition, then it seems as if it would be subject to scientific explanation. That might be true. But we have not yet explained the mechanism by which we are disposed to reason inductively. In other words, not nearly enough is known about the brain to secure an explanation of inductive reasoning. Therefore, our taking this disposition to inductive reasoning as basic cannot, itself, be explained scientifically. Furthermore, if we do not yet have an explanation of the act of inductive reasoning, then we do not yet have good reason to assert that human beings share a life-form. To claim that inductive reasoning can support itself is to put the cart in front of the horse. Thus, the certainty with which we believe we understand each other (as evidenced by the volume of the literature we have written to each other) cannot be supported by the empirical evidence.

Based on the above considerations (thanks to Wittgenstein), I think we have good reason to take our ability to reason inductively as a basic premise of philosophical discourse -- and of discourse simpliciter. In fact, we have good reason to believe that we already do take our ability to reason inductively as basic. But what does this amount to? If inductive reasoning is taken as basic, then we can recognize what is the same; we can categorize these things; we can produce explanations of the differences between categories. In short, we can devise theories about the phenomena that we experience. But the very rules which we follow (addition rather than quaddition) are learned through inductive reasoning. We learn what is red by being shown red things. So our language begins with inductive reasoning and the language-game which we have mastered is nothing more than a theory of meaning.

But is the theory of meaning public or private? Well, we don't always mean the same things. You and I can have a conversation for 10 minutes thinking we are talking about the same thing and never discover that we were actually talking about different things all along. In other words, I can tell you the rule, but unless you actually do understand the language that I use in the same way that I understand it, you will not understand the rule. So if language can admit of multiple adequate understandings -- that is, if two persons can rationally interpret a single sentence in two different ways -- then those two persons mean the sentences in ways which are private. Of course, this doesn't mean that the content of the sentence is private. The whole point of the assumption that we have the same life-form is to secure the public nature of meaning. But the complex set of interlocking rules about appropriate word-usage and the concept of sameness -- i. e. our theory of meaning -- is one that is secured based on the assumption that meaning can be public. Therefore, the certainty that meaning is public is, itself, private. In this way, my theory of meaning may not be known to anyone else, but it is not necessarily private. Nothing that can be said is, itself, private. The only thing about meaning that is private is the certainty that you and I have the ability to understand each other.

But in allowing ourselves to assume the ability to reason inductively -- allowing ourselves to give in to the certainty that meaning is public -- means that we have granted ourselves an ability that we have not granted the rest of the world. The mind is privileged over the material world insofar as it has the ability to explain. But in granting the mind a unique ability, we also grant it basicality. If the human mind were not basic, then the ability would really be an ability that the world has. But the world can only produce human beings who scribble things down and make noises at each other. The physical world, by itself, does not produce meaning. We do.

In other words, we have separated the mind from the matter. Reader beware: I am not trying to verify some sort of complicated soul. Indeed I do not think of the mind as a thing independent of the brain; rather, it seems like an emergent event that only occurs in a healthy human being. Yet, as a naturalist, I must keep in mind that if I want to maintain naturalism, then I must only support the thesis that the mind occurred naturally. There is no reason that a naturalist must also be a monist. Of course this sort of dualism entails that the physical world precedes the mental world both chronologically and logically, for there could not be a mental world without the physical world. But, you might ask, what is the mental world? Well, the mental world is the totality of human communication. It is that which is spoken, written, built, invented, and even that which is imagined. Of course not all of the mental world can be preserved over time. Spoken words, organized events and the like only have meaning for those who remember them. That which is imagined only has meaning for the person who imagines it (though an imagining is, in principle, available to the public both pictorially and linguistically). And as soon as the last person dies, there will be no more meaning because meaning depends on the existence of the minds who think it.

But if the mind is basic in the same way that matter is basic, then we would expect that its complexity rivals that of matter, and that both would require extensive explanation. We might even expect that our explanations are as complicated and intricate as our explanations of matter. Indeed they are: just look at economics, political science and psychology. The very name "social sciences" should suggest to us that mind is distinct from matter, for what else could separate "social science" from "physical science"? One might even include philosophy itself among the social sciences.

Therefore, if the mind is basic in the same way that matter is, then we would expect that there are anomalies in our explanations of the interaction of minds. We would also expect that there is a great deal that we do not know (just as there is a great deal we do not know about the human brain).

Thus, as a naturalist seeking an explanation for the bleeding statue, the second place I would look is to the human mind. Indeed a mechanism is lacking here, and insofar as the mechanism is lacking, the explanation is far from adequate. Nevertheless, it is still absurd to think that human blood could form naturally on the side of a statue. We know enough about the physical world to know that this is impossible. But we know much more about the physical world than we know about our own minds. Therefore, it might be safe for the naturalist to bracket the experience off as being a possible result of the collective effort of human minds.

If the human mind is mostly a mystery to itself, then it should not surprise us if our minds present us with mysterious experiences from time to time.

Keep in mind, though, that we have defined the human mind as a thing which is primarily concerned with meaning, intentions behind actions, reasoning, etc. Thus, if our minds can produce a mysterious physical phenomenon, then the phenomenon must have a meaning. For why else would there be a collective mental effort if that collective effort was not our own minds telling us something?

So then what could the bleeding statue mean? Well, this all depends upon whether the statue is caused to bleed by a single mind or by many minds. And if it is caused to bleed by many minds, then is this collective mental effort, itself, intelligent? To put the matter in a cartoonish way: do all our minds conjoin to form a super-mind? These are all answers that cannot be given based on the premises that I have posited. In any case, I believe that I have provided a sketch of how the naturalist might proceed if presented with an apparently miraculous experience.

Then again, perhaps the bleeding statue is merely a hoax.

-Priam's Pride